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STOP AND FRISK BASED UPON ANONYMOUS
TELEPHONE TIPS
Police face a difficult dilemma when they receive an anony-
mous telephone tip alleging that a certain individual is involved in
ongoing criminal activity. The police can either ignore the information
or investigate the tip. The constitutional question is how far can police
legally proceed with an investigation based on an anonymous tele-
phone call. The fourth amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion guarantees an individual's right to be secure against unreason-
able seizures.1 Before making an arrest, the fourth amendment re-
quires law enforcement officers to have "probable cause" to believe
that the suspect has committed or is committing a crime.2 In Terry v.
U.S. CONST. amend IV. The fourth amendment provides in part: "The right of the
people to be secure in their persons .... against unreasonable ... seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause .... Id. All seizures of the
person, executed pursuant to governmental authority, must comply with the command of
the fourth amendment. See Note, "Profile" Stops and the Fourth Amendment Reasonable
Suspicion or Inarticulate Hunches?, 10 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 112, 133 (1980). The fourth
amendment does not apply to searches and seizures conducted by private citizens. See
Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921). In Burdeau, private detectives working for
McDowell's employer opened McDowell's safe and forced open McDowell's desk. Id. at
472-74. The detectives then turned over the pages contained in the safe and the desk to the
Department of Justice. Id. at 474. The Supreme Court held that the government could use
the papers in a criminal prosecution of McDowell. Id. at 476. The Court found that the
government had noting to do with the wrongful seizure of McDowell's papers and,
therefore, the fourth amendment did not apply. Id. at 475. A search or seizure conducted by
a private citizen involving government participation, however, is within the protection of
the fourth amendment. See Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 78-79 (1949) (fourth amend-
ment is implicated when federal agents had hand in search); United States v. Mekjian, 505
F.2d 1320, 1327 (5th Cir. 1975) (when federal officials participate in search conducted by
private party or stand by as search continues, search must comply with fourth amendment);
Note, Private Searches and Seizures: An Application of the Public Function Theory, 48
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 433, 435 (1980).
' See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 417 (1976) (necessary inquiry is whether
probable cause for arrest exists); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111 (1975) (standard for ar-
rest is probable cause); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100 (1959) (fourth amendment
commands that no arrest warrant shall issue except upon probable cause); Draper v. United
States, 358 U.S. 307, 310-11 (1959) (probable cause is predicate to lawful arrest); Giordenello
v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 485-86 (1958) (fourth amendment requires probable cause to
support arrest warrant).
Probable cause is an elusive concept. See generally Cook, Probable Cause to Arrest, 24
VAND. L. REV. 317, 317 (1970); 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT, § 3.2 (1978 & Supp. 1981). The Supreme Court attempted to define
probable cause in Beck v. Ohio, 479 U.S. 89 (1964). The Beck Court stated that probable
cause exists when a prudent man would be warranted in believing that a suspect had com-
mitted or was committing a crime in light of all the facts and circumstances within the pru-
dent man's knowledge. Id. at 91. In Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949), the
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Ohio,' however, the Supreme Court recognized an exception to the prob-
able cause requirement for brief "investigative stops". 4 In Terry, the
Supreme Court held that a brief stop and frisk based on a "reasonable
Supreme Court stated that probable cause means more than a mere suspicion but less than
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See 338 U.S. at 175.
The probable cause standard applies to both warrantless arrests and arrests pursuant
to a warrant. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. at 17 (probable cause required for war-
rantless arrest); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. at 100 (same); Draper v. United States,
358 U.S. at 310-11 (warrantless arrest lawful when based upon probable cause); Giordenello
v. United States, 357 U.S. at 485-86 (probable cause required for arrest as well as search
warrants). The probable cause standard also applies to any detention that rises to the func-
tional equivalent of an arrest. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212-13 (1979). In
Dunaway, the police placed Dunaway into custody and drove him to police headquarters. Id.
at 203. The police then put Dunaway into an interrogation room where officers questioned
him. Id. The Supreme Court held that even though the police neither told Dunaway that he
was under arrest nor booked him, and Dunaway would not have had an arrest record if the
interrogation had proved fruitless, the detention of Dunaway was the functional equivalent
of an arrest and, therefore, required probable cause. See id. at 212-13.
What constitutes an arrest or the functional equivalent of an arrest depends upon the
scope of the intrusion involved. See id. at 210-16; United States v. White, 648 F.2d 29, 54
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (Edwards, J., dissenting) (any detention greater than requests for identifica-
tion or explanation of suspicious circumstances requires probable cause), cert. denied,
____ U.S. .. 102 S. Ct. 424 (1981); Gless, Arrest and Citation: Definition and
Analysis, 59 NEB. L. Rav. 279, 281-82 (1980). A significant government intrusion, like the
police actions involved in Dunaway, is equivalent to a traditional arrest and, therefore, re-
quires probable cause. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. at 210-16. The police conduct in
Davis v. Mississippi is another example of a significant government intrusion that because
of the scope of the intrusion required probable cause. 394 U.S. 721 (1969). In Davis, the
police, acting upon a rape victim's description of her assailant, took at least twenty-four
black youths to police headquarters. Id. at 722. The police then interrogated and finger-
printed the detainees. Id. The dragnet operation succeeded in implicating Davis in the
crime. Id. at 723. The Supreme Court held that the seizure of Davis was unlawful because
not supported by probable cause. See id. at 726-28. The Davis Court viewed the extensive
intrusion involved in that case as the functional equivalent to an arrest and, therefore, sub-
ject to the probable cause requirements. See id. at 726-27.
393 U.S. 1 (1968).
See id. at 20-22, 30-31. In Terry a Cleveland, Ohio police officer with thirty-nine
years experience became suspicious of Terry and another man. Id. at 5-6. The officer observed
while Terry and his companion repeatedly walked up and down the sidewalk, stopping each
time to peer into the same store window. Id. at 6. The officer, anticipating a hold-up at-
tempt, confronted the men, identified himself as a police officer and asked the men to iden-
tify themselves. Id. at 6-7. When Terry mumbled something in response, the officer spun
Terry around and frisked him. Id. at 7. The policeman discovered a pistol in Terry's breast
pocket. Id. The State of Ohio convicted Terry of carrying a concealed weapon. See id. On ap-
peal, the Supreme Court reasoned that a brief seizure and frisk upon less than probable
cause is not per se unreasonable because a stop and frisk involves a significantly lesser in-
trusion than does an arrest. Id. at 26. The Court struck a balance between the circumscribed
invasion of individual privacy involved in the stop and frisk and the governmental interests
of crime prevention and detection and in the police officer's safety. Id. at 22-27. The result of
the Terry Court's balance was a narrow police authority for a reasonable weapons search
without probable cause for the protection of the officer when the officer reasonably believes
that he is confronting an armed and dangerous individual. Id. at 27. See generally Note,
1438 [Vol. 39:1437
STOP AND FRISK
suspicion" less than probable cause that criminal activity may be afoot did
not violate the fourth amendment The Supreme Court has not determined
Reexamining Fourth Amendment Seizures: A New Starting Point, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 211,
215-17 [hereinafter cited as Starting Point].
Before Terry the Supreme Court had held that the fourth amendment required prob-
able cause before an officer could restrain the liberty of a citizen in any degree. See
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 207-08. Terry represents the first case in which the
Supreme Court recognized a police-citizen encounter less intrusive than an arrest. See id. at
308-10; Starting Point, supra, at 211-12. In Terry, the Court recognized a police intrusion so
significantly less intrusive than an arrest that the encounter need not be subject to the pro-
bable cause standard. See 392 U.S. at 20-22.
5 See 392 U.S. at 30-31. The Terry Court stated that reasonable suspicion exists when
an officer can point to specific, articulable facts that together with rational inferences from
those facts would lead the officer reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that
criminal activity may be afoot. Id. at 20-22, 30-31. Interestingly, the Terry Court avoided ad-
dressing the constitutionality of the stop and focused exclusively on the frisk. See 392 U.S.
at 19 n.16; Note, The Supreme Court 1971 Term: Search and Seizure, Police Power to Stop
and Frisk, 86 HARV. L. REV. 171, 173-74 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Police Power]. The Court
apparently believed that the frisk itself constituted the stop. See Oberly, The Policeman's
Duty and the Law Pertaining to Citizen Encounters, 8 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 653, 657-58
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Encounters]. Justice Harlan, concurring in Terry, argued that
the reasonable suspicion that justifies a limited protective search also justifies a brief deten-
tion in order to carry out the search. 392 U.S. at 31-33 (Harlan, J., concurring). The right to
frisk then follows automatically upon the right to stop. Id. at 33-34 (Harlan, J., concurring);
see Police Power, supra, at 174-75 (Justice Harlan's approach is sensible). The Supreme
Court implicitly adopted the Harlan approch to Terry in Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143
(1972). See Police Power, supra, at 174-75 (Williams implicitly adopts view of Justice
Harlan); Comment, Stop and Frisk: Warrantless Car Searches-Adams v. Williams, 407
U.S. 143 (1972), 50 DEN. L.J. 243, 249 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Stop and Frisk] (Williams
adopts Harlan configuration of Terry rule).
The Terry Court did not determine whether the officer seized Terry when the officer
first approached the suspect. See 392 U.S. at 19 n.16; Encounters, supra, at 657-58. The
Court could not determine upon the record whether the officer seized Terry before the frisk
occurred. 392 U.S. at 19 n.16. The Terry court assumed, therefore, that no seizure occurred
before the officer frisked Terry. Id. Chief Justice Warren, writing for the majority in Terry,
suggested that not every officer approach of a citizen constitutes a seizure of the person. Id.
(not all intercourse between the police and citizens involves seizure of person). The
threshold question in any stop and frisk case is whether a seizure has occurred. See Start-
ing Point, supra note 4, at 219-20 (full articulation in Terry of when seizure occurs would
have provided starting point for Terry analysis). In United States v. Mendenhall, Justice
Stewart articulated a standard for determining when police have seized a person. See 446
U.S. 544, 551-57 (1980). In Mendenhall, the defendant arrived at the Detroit Airport on an
airline flight from Los Angeles. Id. at 547. Agents from the Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion (DEA) noticed that Mendenhall's conduct fit squarely into the "drug courier profile", an
abstract of characteristics used by law enforcement officials, as an aid in detecting drug
smugglers. Id. at 547-48, 547 n.1. The agents approached Mendenhall and identified
themselves as federal agents. Id. at 547-48. When the agents specifically identified
themselves as narcotics agents Mendenhall appeared quite agitated. Id. at 548. Mendenhall
then proceeded voluntarily, pursuant to the agent's request, to the DEA office for question-
ing. Id. A voluntary search of Mendenhalrs person uncovered narcotics. Id. at 548-49.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Justices Stewart and Rehnquist reasoned that the
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whether an anonymous telephone tip may furnish the reasonable suspicion
required for a brief investigative stop.'
The Supreme Court has held that information supplied by a con-
fidential informant, whose identity is known to the police, can provide
the probable cause necessary for an arrest.' In Aguilar v. Texas,8 the
Court announced a two-pronged test an informant's tip must pass before
the tip can yield the probable cause necessary for an arrest or search.'
First, the tip must reveal facts from which a magistrate could conclude
that the informant had a sufficient basis for his allegations.'" Second, a
law enforcement official must present facts from which the magistrate
DEA agents had not seized Mendenhall. See id. at 551-57. Justice Stewart argued that the
fourth amendment is only meant to prevent government overreaching and not to eliminate
all contact between the police and the citizen. See id. at 553-54. Justice Stewart concluded
that a seizure occurs only if, in view of all the surrounding circumstances, a reasonable per-
son would believe that he is not free to leave. Id. at 553-54. The subjective intent of the of-
ficer, stated Justice Stewart, is irrelevant except insofar as the officer conveys his subjec-
tive intent to the suspect. Id. at 554 n.6. The fact that the DEA agents never told
Mendenhall that she was free to leave is also irrelevant. See id. at 555-56. Justice Stewart's
view, however, did not command a majority of the Court, as Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Powell and Blackmun, the other members of the Court who created the majority
for the purpose of upholding the search, did not reach the seizure question. See id. at 560-66
(Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). The concurring Justices
assumed that the DEA agents seized Mendenhall and upheld the seizure as a valid Terry
stop. See id. at 560, 561-66 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
See Starting Point, supra note 4, at 225 n.87 (commending Justice Stewart for his approach
but suggesting that Supreme Court should have remanded to district court for evidentiary
hearing).
' See White v. United States, __ U.S. .. 102 S. Ct. 424, 425-27 (1981) (White,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Jernigan v. Louisiana, 446 U.S. 958, 958-60 (1980)
(White, J., dissenting from denial of certioari). Cf. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.s. 143, 146
(anonymous telephone tip less reliable than tip given in person) (dictum).
' See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 412-13, 414 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378
U.S. 108, 114 (1964).
378 U.S. 108 (1964).
6 See 378 U.S. at 113-15. The Aguilar analysis is often referred to as the Aguilar two-
pronged test. See LaFave, Probable Cause From Informants: The Effects of Murphy's Law
on Fourth Amendment Adjudication, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 4 [hereinafter cited as Informants].
The test contains a "basis of knowledge" prong and a "veracity" prong. See text accompany-
ing notes 10-11. While Aguilar involved an application for a search warrant, see 378 U.S. at
109, the Court has held that the Aguilar two-pronged test is applicable to situations in
which an informant's tip purportedly establishes probable cause for a warrantless arrest or
search. See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 417 n.5 (1969); McCray v. Illinois, 386
U.S. 300, 304 (1967); Moylan, Hearsay and Probable Cause: An Aquilar and Spinelli Primer,
25 MERCER L. REV. 741, 752-54 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Moylan].
,1 See 378 U.S. at 114-15. Courts refer to the requirement of Aguilar that the informant's
tip contain facts from which a magistrate could conclude that the informer has an adequate
basis for his allegation as the "basis of knowledge" prong. See Moylan, supra note 9, at 754.
The basis of knowledge prong seeks to uncover how the informant knows what he alleges.
See Note, The Informer's Tip as Probable Cause For Search or Arrest, 54 CORNELL L. REV.
958, 960 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Informer's Tip]. The basis of knowledge prong of
Aguilar guards against the possibility that a magistrate will issue a warrant based merely
upon a casual rumor circulating within the underworld. See Informer's Tip, supra, at 960.
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could determine either that the informant himself is credible or that his
information inherently is reliable."
The Supreme Court in Adams v. Williams2 addressed whether a
known informant's tip can supply the reasonable suspicion necessary for
a stop and frisk." In Williams, a known informant approached an officer
on patrol and told the officer that a person in a nearby car was carrying
narcotics and had a gun at his waist. 4 The officer then approached the
vehicle to investigate the informant's information.15 The officer tapped
on the car window and asked the occupant to open the door." When
Williams opened the window instead, the officer reached into the car and
pulled a loaded pistol from Williams' waistband. 7 The Supreme Court
held that that officer's actions complied with the stop and frisk stand-
ards enunciated in Terry v. Ohio.8
The Williams Court noted that because the informant came forward
personally, Williams was a stronger case supporting the use of an inform-
ant's tip to justify a Terry stop than the case of an anonymous telephone
tip. 9 The Williams Court did not subject the informant's tip to the stand-
" See 378 U.S. at 114-15. The requirement contained in Aguilar that the police officer
present facts from which the magistrate could determine that the informant is credible or
his information reliable is known as the "veracity prong" of Aguilar. See Moylan, supra note
9, at 754. The veracity prong has two spurs. Id. at 755. The credibility spur focuses on the
truthfulness of the informant himself. Seb id. The reliability spur focuses on the informant's
information. See id. The two veracity prong spurs are disjunctive, permitting the govern-
ment to satisfy the veracity prong by passing either the credibility test or the reliability
test. See 378 U.S. at 114-15; Moylan, supra note 9, at 156-57. The veracity prong of Aguilar
attempts to insure that police cannot use tips from untruthful or unreliable informants to
form the basis of a probable cause determination. See Informer's Tip, supra note 10, at 960;
Rebell, The Undisclosed Informant and The Fourth Amendment, A Search for Meaningful
Standards, 81 YALE L.J. 703, 712-14 (1972) (many informants come from criminal mileau and
operate from inherently suspect motives, and reliability of such persons is therefore
suspect).
12 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
" See id. at 144-49; text accompanying notes 14-25 infra.
14 407 U.S. at 144-45. The informant in Williams had given the same officer a tip on one
prior occasion regarding homosexual activity at a local railroad station. See id. at 156 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting).
11 Id. at 145.
"Id.
" Id. After the police officer in Williams discovered the pistol, he arrested Williams
for unlawful possession of a firearm. Id. A search incident to the arrest yielded more contra-
band. Id. Connecticut tried and convicted Williams for unlawful possession of a firearm as
well as possession of heroin. Id. at 144.
s See id. at 144; text accompanying notes 3-5 supra.
" See 407 U.S. at 146-47. The Williams Court did not discuss why an anonymous
telephone tip is inherently less trustworthy than an in person tip. See id. The New York
Court of Appeals in People v. DeBour, however, advanced several reasons why anonymous
telephone tips inherently are weaker than in person anonymous tips. 40 N.Y.2d 210, 352
N.E. 2d 562, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1976). An anonymous telephone tip inherently is weak
because the authorities cannot hold the tipster accountable if his information turns out to
have been untruthful. Id. at 224, 352 N.E.2d at 573, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 386. Furthermore, when
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ard probable cause analysis contained in Aguilar." Instead, the Court
stated that the tip carried sufficient "indicia of reliability" to justify the
officer's brief intrusion."1 The Williams Court identified three indicia of
reliability surrounding the tip that supplied the reasonable suspicion
necessary to justify a forcible stop and frisk.2 First, the officer knew the
informant personally and the informant had provided the officer with in-
formation in the past.23 Second, the informant was subject to criminal
prosecution had his tip proved untrue.24 Finally, the informant came for-
ward personally and gave information that the police officer immediately
could verify."
The Supreme Court has twice declined to decide whether an
anonymous telephone tip can form the basis of a valid Terry stop.26
Recently, the Court refused to review United States v. Whiten in which
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that an
anonymous telephone tip can furnish reasonable suspicion for a Terry
stop.28 In White, police received an anonymous telephone tip regarding
an ongoing narcotics transaction.' The caller told police that a young
black man known as "Nicky" was about to purchase drugs. 0 The inform-
ant gave police Nicky's age and a description of Nicky's clothing."' The
caller also described how the transaction was taking place.2 Nicky had
parked a Ford in front of a certain house in Washington, D.C., then
a tipster communicates his information by telephone the officer cannot measure intangible
indicia of reliability like the informant's facial expression and emotional state. Id. at 224, 352
N.E.2d at 573, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 386.
2o See 407 U.S. at 146-47; Police Power, supra note 5, at 177-78 (Williams Court im-
plicitly conceded it was relaxing Aguilar tests for stop and frisk encounters); Stop and
Frisk, supra note 5, at 247 (Williams makes clear that strict requirements of Aguilar are in-
applicable to stop and frisk encounters). The Williams Court apparently reasoned that
because police may stop and frisk upon an articulable suspicion less than probable cause the
judicial officer need not judge the informant's tip that supplies the predicate for a stop and
frisk upon the standard devised to determine whether probable cause exists. See Stop and
Frisk, supra note 5, at 247-48; Police Power, supra note 5, at 177-78.
21 407 U.S. at 146-47.
See id.; text accompanying notes 23-25 infra.
See 407 U.S. at 146-47; note 14 supra.
24 See 407 U.S. at 146-57. Cf. United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 383-84 (1971) (admis-
sion against penal interest may be sufficient to establish credibility under Aguilar).
' See 407 U.S. at 146-47.
2 See White v. United States, __ U.S. , 102 S. Ct. 424, 425-27 (1981) (White,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Jernigan v. Louisiana, 446 U.S. 958, 958-60 (1980)
(White, J., dissenting from denial of certioari).
" 648 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 102 S. Ct. 424, 425-27 (1981)
(White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
2 648 F.2d at 43, 45.
See id. at 30-31.
See id. at 31.
See id. at 30. The informant in White described Nicky as about 19 or 20 years old
and wearing a blue jumpsuit with white stripes. Id.
I See id. at 30-31.
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entered an Oldsmobile and drove off.3 The informant gave police the
license plate numbers on both cars and described the color of the Ford."
According to the caller, Nicky would be returning with narcotics 5
Two detectives immediately responded to the tip by driving in an
unmarked patrol car to the street corner nearest to the house and
establishing surveillance. The detectives spotted the Ford parked in
front of the house. Shortly thereafter, the Oldsmobile pulled behind the
Ford and stopped.' The detectives pulled their crusier alongside the
Oldsmobile, exited from the cruiser, and ordered White out of his car. 9
As White was getting out of his car a piece of tinfoil fell to the ground.
4
1
The detectives then arrested White. 1 The District of Columbia Circuit
sustained the actions of the detectives leading up to White's exit from
the car as a valid Terry stop based upon reasonable suspicion.'
In upholding the investigative stop in White the D.C. Circuit noted
that the tip contained a detailed description of the criminal plan and the
defendant. 3 Furthermore, the White court noted that police surveillance
corroborated all details of the tip except for the actual possession of nar-
cotics." The D.C. Circuit reasoned that a detailed tip regarding criminal
activity that proves to be accurate in all innocent details can furnish the
reasonable suspicion required for a brief investigatory stop. 5 The White
13See id. The informant in White said that Nicky had parked a 1971 Ford LTD in front
of No. 1, 15th Street, N.E., Washington, D.C., and that Nicky had driven away from the
house in a 1974 four-door Oldsmobile. Id.
" See id. at 31.
3 Id.





40 See id. at 32.
" See id. After the detectives in White placed White under arrest, they searched the
Oldsmobile. See id. The search uncovered more tinfoils containing narcotics. See id. The
police officers also discovered assorted narcotics paraphernalia. See id.
2 See id. at 32, 43, 45-46. The Government conceded in White that the detectives did
not have probable cause to arrest when they approached the car. Id. at 32. White conceded,
on appeal, that probable cause for arrest did exist once the detective spotted the tinfoil. Id.
The issue in White, therefore, centered upon the propriety of the police actions leading up
to White's exit from the car. Id.
See id. at 40-41; text accompanying notes 29-35 supra.
See 648 F.2d at 41, 45.
's See id. at 43. The White court stated that the detailed description of the criminal
episode suggested that the informant himself saw Nicky leave in the Oldsmobile and that
the informant knew enough about Nicky's actions to predict when the Oldsmobile would
return and what Nicky would be doing in the meantime. See id. at 44. The detail contained
in the tip, therefore, suggested that the anonymous informant possessed a sufficient basis of
knowledge and imparted to the tip an index of reliability. See id. at 44. The corroboration of
innocent details through police surveillance gave the tip another index of reliability. See id.
41-42. The court implied that even if corroboration of innocent facts is insufficient to thrust
a detailed anonymous tip over the probable cause threshold, corroboration of innocent facts
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court emphasized the nature of the crime reasoning that the police have
great need for informants' tips in narcotics related investigations." The
court concluded that under the particular facts of White the tip was a
sufficient predicate for a Terry stop.47
Other federal circuit courts have split over whether an anonymous
tip may furnish reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop.48 The Fifth and
Ninth Circuits have found anonymous tips insufficient to support a
Terry stop, stressing the lack of proof regarding the factual foundation
of the tip. 9 The Fifth Circuit, in United States v. McLeroy,0 held that an
anonymous tip regarding the possession of a sawed-off shotgun, even
when police had verified innocent details of the informant's report, was
insufficient to support a Terry stop because nothing in the record showed
that the information was reliable or that the informant had a sufficient
factual basis for his allegation." Similarly, the Ninth Circuit, in United
is enough to carry a detailed tip over the lower reasonable suspicion level. See id. The detail
of the tip together with the verification of innocent portions of the informant's report sup-
plied the anonymous tip with enough indicia of reliability to justify the forcible stop. See id.
at 40-45.
1 See id. at 43-44. The White court believed that the need for informant's tips in drug related
investigations is particularly acute because there are not reporting "victims" in drug cases. See id. at
43-44. Narcotics investigators, therefore, depend upon undercover work and informants' tips for
needed information. See id. The White court also took notice of the fact that citizen informants fear
retaliation from drug dealers and users and, therefore, the informants prefer anonymity. See id. at
43.
" See id. at 43.
8 See text accompanying notes 49-63 infra; United States v. McClinnhan, 660 F.2d 500,
502-03 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (detailed and corroborated anonymous tip contains sufficient indicia of
reliability to justify Terry stop especially when reported contraband is deadly weapon); United
States v. Gorin, 564 F.2d 159, 161 (4th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (Aguilar standards do not apply
when only reasonable suspicion needed), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1080 (1978); United States v.
DeVita, 526 F.2d 81, 83 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (no reasonable suspicion provided by
unreliable informant's vague tip even after corroboration of innocent facts); Ojeda-Vinales v. Im-
migration & Naturalization Serv., 523 F.2d 286, 287-88 (2d Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (anonymous
telephone tip containing detailed information, that if true, established violation of immigration law
coupled with corroboration of report supplied reasonable suspicion); United States v. Cage, 494
F.2d 740, 742 (10th Cir. 1974) (per curiam) (police entitled to make Terry stop on basis of tip of
unknown origin that occupants of particular automobile had just committed assault and were carry-
ing sawed-off shotgun); United States v. Hernandez, 486 F.2d 614, 616-17 & n.2 (7th Cir. 1973)
(per curiam) (detailed and corroborated anonymous tip carries sufficient indicia of reliability to
outweigh risk of acting on basis of anonymous tip), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 959 (1974); United
States v. Legato, 480 F.2d 408, 411-12 (5th Cir.) (detailed anonymous tip regarding airlines
passengers with bomb linked with corroboration of innocent facts and suspicious behavior justify in-
vestigatory stop), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 979 (1973).
'" See text accompanying notes 50-53 infra.
w 584 F.2d 746 (5th Cir. 1978).
"' See id. at 748; text accompanying note 44 supra. In McLeroy an unidentified informant
told police that a black and white 1977 Chevrolet bearing Alabama license BMB-023 was parked at
1720 27th Street in Ensley, Alabama. See 584 F.2d at 747. The informant stated that the car had
a damaged right side and might have been involved in a hit and run accident. See id. McLeroy was
in possession of the car, according to the report, but the car did not belong to McLeroy and was
possibly a stolen vehicle. See id. Furthermore, the informant said that a sawed-off shotgun was in-
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States v. Robinson,5 2 held that an anonymous tip regarding the transpor-
tation of a stolen vehicle could not provide reasonable suspicion because
the record lacked any proof regarding the factual foundation for the tip.53
The First and Sixth Circuits have allowed anonymous tips to sup-
port a Terry stop stressing the detail and corroboration of the tips
through independent police observation.' In United States v. Rodriguez
Perez" the First Circuit held that an anonymous tip implicating
Rodriguez Perez in an ongoing counterfeit currency transaction was suf-
ficient to support a valid Terry stop. 6 The Rodriguez Perez court
side the car. Id. Acting upon the tip, the police determined that McLeroy's address matched the ad-
dress the informant had given. Id. Police proceeded to the address and saw a car matching the in-
formant's description parked nearby. Id. When McLeroy drove off, the police pulled the car over.
See id. Police then checked the vehicle identification number of McLeroy's car and found that the
car had been stolen. See id. Police arrested McLeroy for buying, receiving, and concealing stolen
property. See id. During an inventory search of the Chevrolet police uncovered a sawed-off
shotgun. Id. A federal district court convicted McLeroy of unregistered possession of a sawed-off
shotgun. See id.; 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (1976). The Fifth Circuit held that the initial stop of
McLeroy's car was unjustified as not supported by reasonable suspicion. See 584 F.2d at 747-48.
The McLeroy court reversed the conviction because the shotgun was the fruit of an unlawful stop
and, therefore, was inadmissible into evidence at trial. See id. at 747.
52 536 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir. 1976).
See id. at 1299. In Robinson, a police officer stopped an automobile on the basis of a
radio message from a police dispatcher. See id. The dispatcher told the officer to be on the
lookout for a possibly stolen 1976 Oldsmobile Cutlass, Nevada license CKC-434. See id. The
exact source of the information was unknown. See id. The officer spotted the described
vehicle and stopped it. Id. Robinson, the driver, did not have his driver's license so the of-
ficer arrested him for driving without a license. See id. While Robinson was in custody he
admitted that he had stolen the car. See id. A federal district court convicted Robinson of
interstate transportation of a stolen motor vehicle. See id.; 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1976). On ap-
peal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the conviction reasoning that the confession had been the
fruit of an unlawful stop. See 536 F.2d at 1299. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the stop was
unlawful because the officer based the stop on information from an unknown source and the
government had tendered no proof of the factual foundation for the information. See id.
See text accompanying notes 53-64 infra.
625 F.2d 1021 (1st Cir. 1980).
See id. at 1026. In Rodriguez Perez, an anonymous informant telephoned the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to report that Perez was attempting to sell or pass
counterfeit United States currency. See id. at 1022. The informant told the FBI that
Rodriguez Perez was staying at the Hotel Bolivar in Santruce, Puerto Rico. See id. When
agents arrived at the hotel, they spotted Rodriguez Perez entering the lobby from a cor-
ridor. See id. The agents approached Rodriguez Perez and identified themselves as Secret
Service agents. See id. The agents asked Perez if he would agree to talk to the agents in his
room. See id. During a subsequent consent search the agents uncovered counterfeit money.
See id. at 1023. A federal district court convicted Perez of possession of counterfeit curren-
cy. See id. at 1022; 18 U.S.C. § 472 (1976). On appeal to the First Circuit Rodriguez Perez
argued that the counterfeit currency was the fruit of an unlawful Terry stop and, therefore,
the trial court should have suppressed the currency evidence. See 625 F.2d at 1025.
Rodriguez Perez argued that the initial encounter with the agents in the lobby of the Hotel
Bolivar was an unlawful Terry type seizure because the agents lacked reasonable suspicion
that Perez was committing, or about to commit, a crime. See id. The First Circuit stated,
however, that even assuming the encounter rose to the level of a Terry stop, the stop was
legal. See id. at 1026.
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reasoned that while an anonymous telephone tip was insufficient to
establish probable cause for arrest, the tip justified further investiga-
tion.7 The First Circuit suggested that a Terry stop was the appropriate
method to further investigate the anonymous tip. 8 The Sixth Circuit, in
United States v. Andrews,59 upheld an investigatory stop on the basis of
a detailed anonymous telephone tip alleging that Andrews possessed
narcotics. 0 The Andrews court stressed the fact that independent police
observation corroborated innocent details of the informant's report.'
Furthermore, the informant had told police that Andrews was going to
deliver the drugs to a person known to police to be a narcotics dealer.2
The Andrews court specifically stated that the detail and independent
corroboration of an anonymous telephone tip can provide sufficient in-
dicia of reliability to justify a brief investigatory stop. 3
, See 625 F.2d at 1026.
See id.
s 600 F.2d 563 (6th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Brooks v. United States, 444 U.S. 878
(1979).
' See 600 F.2d at 564, 566, 568. in Andrews, Drug Enforcement Administration agents
received an anonymous telephone tip alleging that Andrews would be arriving at Detroit
Airport from Los Angeles at about 4:00 p.m. that day with narcotics in his possession. See
id. at 564. The caller gave a detailed personal description of Andrews and stated that
another person may be accompanying Andrews. See id. The informant further stated that
Andrews was going to deliver the narcotics to Sylvester Rhine. See id. The agents knew
from past investigations that Rhine was a local drug dealer. See id. at 564, 566-67.
Further investigation revealed that the only flight arriving from Los Angeles at ap-
proximately 4:00 p.m. that day was American Airlines flight 68. See id. at 564. The agents
proceeded to the airport to meet flight 68. See id. Andrews, who met the informant's
description, deplaned with two companions and proceeded to the baggage claim area. See
id. at 564-65. As Andrews and his companions approached a cab outside the baggage claim
area the agents stopped them and asked for identification. See id. at 565. A subsequent
search uncovered the drugs. See id. at 565.
The Sixth Circuit upheld the initial detention of Andrews as a valid Terry stop. See id.
at 566. The Andrews court first noted that the anonymous tip failed both prongs of the
Aguilar test for probable cause. See id. Nevertheless, the court argued that the tip did sup-
ply reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop. See id. at 566, 567, 568. The Sixth Circuit
reasoned that because the tip contained detail and because both the agent's knowledge and
personal observations corroborated the tip, the tip possessed sufficient indicia of reliability
to justify a Terry stop. See id. at 566-70.
", See id. at 564, 567; note 60 supra.
62 See 600 F.2d at 564, 567; note 60 supra. In Ballou v. Massachusetts, an anonymous
telephone tip together with corroboration of the informant's report by other facts known by
the police formed the basis for a valid Terry stop. 403 F.2d 982, 985-86 (1st Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 909 (1969). In Ballou, Boston police received an anonymous tip that McLean
and Ballou were in a bar and were carrying guns. See id. at 983. The police knew Ballou
previously had served time in prison for illegal possession of a firearm. Id. The police also
knew that Ballou and McLean were friends and that Ballou was the leader of a faction cur-
rently involved in a gang war which had already resulted in several murders. Id. The First
Circuit held that the anonymous tip when coupled with the other facts known to police
created reasonable suspicion to support a valid investigatory stop. See id. at 986. Cf. United
States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 583 (1971) (plurality opinion) (magistrate may rely on
policeman's knowledge of suspect's reputation in assessing reliability of informant's tip).
See 600 F.2d at 568.
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The decisions from state courts regarding the status of an
anonymous telephone tip also reflect a division of opinion." The New
Jersey Supreme Court has approved stop and frisks based on
anonymous telephone tips regarding deadly weapons." In In re H.B.,66
the New Jersey court upheld a stop and frisk of H.B. based on an
anonymous tip alleging that H.B. was carrying a gun." The H.B. court
emphasized the need for a realistic approach to stop and frisk in light of
the proliferation of handguns throughout the country."
The New Jersey Supreme Court, however, limited its holding in H.B.
to tips regarding lethal materials such as firearms and explosives. 9 The
H.B. court stated that the abundance of handguns presents a significant
danger to law abiding citizens and especially to police officers.10 The
court reasoned that the violent nature of modern society is a factor the
court could not ignore in considering the constitutionality of a particular
investigative detention." The New Jersey Supreme Court further noted
that the accuracy of the informant's description provided the tip with an
". See text accompanying notes 65-79 infra; Conor v. State, 260 Ark. 172, -, 538
S.W.2d 304, 305 (1976) (anonymous tip standing alone cannot justify stop of moving vehicle);
State v. Kea, 61 Hawaii 566, -, 606 P.2d 1329, 1331 (1980) (per curiam) (reasonable
suspicion found when anonymous informant told police that basis of tip was personal obser-
vations); State v. Hobson, 95 Idaho 920, -, 523 P.2d 523, 528 (1974) (specific and detailed
anonymous tip can create reasonable suspicion); State v. Jernigan, 377 So. 2d 1222, 1225 (La.
1979) (detailed tip verified by police observations supplied reasonable suspicion), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 958 (1980); State v. Hasenbank, - Me. - - 425 A.2d 1330,
1333 (1981) (specificity and corroboration of anonymous tip provide sufficient indicia of
reliability to justify Terry stop), affd on rehearing, 436 A.2d 1130 (1981); Commonwealth v.
Anderson, 481 Pa. 292, , 392 A.2d 1298, 1301 (1978) (anonymous telephone tip describ-
ing escapee from drug rehabilitation program in vague terms does not create reasonable
suspicion); Commonwealth v. Cruse, 236 Pa. Super. Ct- 85, 89-91, 344 A.2d 532, 535 (1975)
(corroboration of innocent details not enough to create reasonable suspicion from
anonymous tip).
See text accompanying notes 66-73 infra.
75 N.J. 243, 381 A.2d 759 (1977).
' See id. at 248, 252, 381 A.2d at 762, 764.
See id. at 245, 381 A.2d at 759-60; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1968). In H.B., two
Newark policemen responded to a radio dispatch reporting that a black man wearing a black
hat, black leather coat and checkered pants was in a certain diner with a gun in his posses-
sion. See 75 N.J. at 248, 381 A.2d at 761. The source of the information apparently was an
anonymous tip. See id. at 248, 381 A.2d at 761. When the officers entered the diner, they
saw approximately fifteen people inside. See id. at 248, 381 A.2d at 761. One of the officers
approached the suspect and ordered the youth to stand against the wall. See id. at 248, 381
A.2d at 762. The officer frisked the suspect and found a revolver in the suspect's coat pocket.
See id. at 248, 381 A.2d at 762. The State tried H.B. for possession of a firearm. See id. at
244, 381 A.2d at 759. The state trial court adjudicated H.B. a juvenile delinquent. See id. at
244, 381 A.2d at 759. On appeal to the New Jersey Supreme Court, H.B. challenged the
legality of the frisk that uncovered the weapon. See id. at 245, 381 A.2d at 759.
" See 75 N.J. at 251-52, 381 A.2d at 763. The New Jersey Supreme Court specifically
excluded from the thrust of the H.B. opinion tips concerning glassine bags containing
heroin. See id. at 251-52, 381 A.2d at 763.
,0 See id. at 246, 381 A.2d at 760.
See id. at 246, 381 A.2d at 760.
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index of reliability.2 The accurate description of the suspect coupled
with the vulnerability of the officer combined in H.B. to render the in-
vestigatory detention reasonable under the fourth amendment.73
In contrast to In re H.B., the New York Court of Appeals has held
that an anonymous telephone tip alleging that a black man in a red shirt
was carrying a gun in a certain bar was too vague to provide reasonable
suspicion for a Terry stop. 4 In People v. DeBour,75 the New York Court
of Appeals noted that anonymous telephone tips are the weakest type of
tip.7" The Court of Appeals also stated that the tip under consideration
was vague because the tip lacked specificity and individual descriptive
details.77 A vague tip, reasoned the court, raises the real possibility that
the suspect was not the man the informant meant to describe.78 The
DeBour court concluded by observing that the courts would severely
erode the constitutional rights of citizens if they allowed police to stop
and frisk on no more than an anonymous telephone tip. 9
72 See id. at 249, 381 A.2d at 762; note 68 supra.
73 See 75 N.J. at 249, 251, 252, 381 A.2d at 762, 763, 764. The H.B. court reasoned that
the officer was vulnerable because he was in full uniform in a crowded place in which an in-
formant had reported that there was a man at large with a gun. See id. at 249, 381 A.2d at
762. The H.B. court equated vulnerability with exigency. See id. at 251, 381 A.2d at 763. As
the court noted, exigency is a significant factor in determining whether an officer's conduct
is reasonable under the fourth amendment. See id. at 251, 381 A.2d at 763, citing Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) (fourth amendment does not require police to delay in-
vestigation if delay would endanger their lives or lives of others).
" See text accompanying notes 75-79 infra.
15 40 N.Y.2d 210, 352 N.E.2d 562, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1976).
11 See id. at 224, 352 N.E.2d at 573, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 386; note 19 supra. In DeBour,
police received an anonymous telephone tip alleging that there was a man with a gun at a
certain bar. See 40 N.Y.2d at 222,. 352 N.E.2d at 571, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 384. The informant
described the suspect as a black man wearing a red shirt. See id. at 222, 352 N.E.2d at 571,
386 N.Y.S.2d at 384. Police responded to the tip by dispatching several officers to the bar.
See id. at 222, 352 N.E.2d at 571, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 384. After entering the bar the officers
spotted a black man wearing a red shirt. See id. at 222, 352 N.E.2d at 571, 386 N.Y.S.2d at
384. The officers immediately converged upon the suspect and ordered him to freeze. See id.
at 222, 352 N.E.2d at 571, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 384.
An officer then frisked the suspect and discovered a fully-loaded automatic pistol. See
id. at 222, 352 N.E.2d at 571, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 384. The issue before the New York Court of
Appeals was whether the anonymous phone tip justified the forcible frisk of the suspect.
See id. at 222, 352 N.E.2d at 571, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 384. The record showed that the policemen
did nothing to verify the tip once they entered the bar, such as question the bartender. See
id. at 222, 352 N.E.2d at 571, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 384. Furthermore, the officers made no at-
tempt to determine whether other red-shirted black men were in the bar. See id. 222, 352
N.E.2d at 571, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 384.
" See id. at 225, 352 N.E.2d at 573, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 386.
78 See id. at 225, 352 N.E.2d at 573, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 386. The DeBour court noted that
the possibility of misidentification by police was high in DeBour since the officers admitted
that they did not check to see whether other black men wearing red shirts were present at
the bar before the officers accosted the suspect. See id. at 222, 225, 352 N.E.2d at 571, 573,
86 N.Y.S.2d at 384, 386; note 76 supra.
" See 40 N.Y.2d at 226, 352 N.E.2d at 574, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 387. But see People v. Ben-
jamin, 51 N.Y.2d 267, 270-71, 414 N.E.2d 645, 647-48, 434 N.Y.S.2d 144, 146 (1980) (detailed
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The Supreme Court, in Adams v. Williams, stated that the fourth
amendment requires an informant's tip to carry sufficient "indicia of
reliability" before the tip can provide the reasonable suspicion required
for a brief investigative stop.0 A detailed anonymous tip alleging that a
person is committing a serious crime that police corroborate with in-
dependent information is sufficiently reliable to provide the reasonable
suspicion necessary for a brief investigative stop. Detail in the
anonymous tip provides the tip with an index of reliability. The Supreme
Court has suggested that a tip containing sufficient detail inherently can
show that the informant has an adequate basis of knowledge upon which
to base his allegation." The function of detail in the fourth amendment
analysis is to reduce the risk that the informant is reporting a mere
rumor. 2 The wealth of detail in a tip suggests that the informant himself
has seen the suspect and that the informant is reporting his first hand
observations.' Even if the informant is not reporting his personal obser-
vations, the detail in the tip provides assurance that the tipster is rely-
ing on information more substantial than a casual rumor.84
A tip containing sufficient, detailed descriptive characteristics of the
suspect, so that a trained police officer can reasonably distinguish the
suspect from others in the area, should be enough detail to provide the
tip with an index of reliability. Arguably, innocent descriptive detail
anonymous tip can create reasonable suspicion when police corroborate tip by on-the-scene
observations).
' See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143,147 (1972); text accompanying notes 12-25 supra.
', See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 416-17 (1969). In Spinelli, the Supreme
Court explained how a warrant application based on an informant's tip that fails to pass the
Aguilar tests can be cured so as to provide probable cause. See id. at 415-18. Spinelli sug-
gests that a defect in the "basis of knowledge" prong of Aguilar may be cured if the tip is
sufficiently detailed so that one reasonably could conclude that the tipster was not relying
upon mere rumor. See id. at 416, 417. Justice Harlan, writing for the majority in Spinelli,
treated self-verifying detail as a cure to an Aguilar "basis of knowledge" prong defect, not
as an alternative method of passing the "basis of knowledge" prong. See id. at 416-18; In-
former's Tip, supra note 10, at 962 n.26.
The Spinelli Court cited Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959), as an example of
a tip containing self-verifying detail. See 393 U.S. at 416. In Draper, an informant of known
credibility told a narcotics officer that Draper would be coming to Denver by train and
would be carrying narcotics. 358 U.S. at 309. The informant gave the officer a detailed
description of Draper and the clothes he would be wearing. See id. The informant described
the bag Draper would be carrying and told the officer that Draper habitually walked fast.
See id. The Court held that the tip combined with the officer's personal observations cor-
roborating the tip supplied the necessary probable cause to arrest Draper. See id. at 312-13.
" See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. at 415-18; Informants, supra note 9, at 47-48.
" See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. at 425 (extensive detail in tip may imply that
informant is basing his allegations on personal observation) (White, J., concurring); United
States v. White, 648 F.2d at 44 (detailed description of criminal episode suggests informant
witnessed transaction).
" See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. at 416. The detail in a tip provides assurance
that the tipster is not reporting a mere rumor becausb as a rumor circulates the details of
the story are lost and the report becomes a generalized allegation.
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may suggest that the informant has seen the suspect, but innocent detail
provides no guarantee that the tipster did not base his allegation of
criminal conduct on a mere unsubstantiated rumor.85 The case for accept-
ing innocent detail to show an adequate basis of knowledge in the
reasonable suspicion setting is strong, however, because the Supreme
Court has suggested that innocent detail is sufficient in probable cause
analysis to show that the informant had an adequate basis of knowledge
for his allegations.86 Furthermore, both innocent and incriminating detail
serve to reduce the risk that the informant is reporting a mere rumor."
Innocent detail, therefore, should provide an anonymous tip with an in-
dex of reliability.
Corroboration of an informant's tip from independent sources pro-
vides the tip with another index of reliability. The Supreme Court has
advanced the view that corroboration of an informant's tale can
establish the informant's credibility."8 Corroboration of the informant's
" See Informer's Tip, supra note 10, at 946-66 (innocent detail may suggest that in-
former has had personal contact with suspect but provides no assurance that informer did
not base his allegation of criminal activity on mere rumor).
" See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. at 416. The Spinelli Court cited Draper v.
United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959), as an example of a tip containing self-verifying detail. See
393 U.S. at 416; note 81 supra. Since the tip in Draper involved only innocent details,
Spinelli suggests that a self-verifying tip need contain no incriminating details. The proposi-
tion that wholly innocent detail can supply the basis of a self-verifying tip has come under
criticism. See Informer's Tip, supra note 10, at 964-66 (innocent detail may suggest that in-
former has had personal contact with suspect but provides no assurance that informer did
not base his allegation of criminal activity on mere rumor).
8? See text accompanying note 82 supra.
See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. at 415. Spinelli suggests a defect in the
Aguilar "veracity" test may be cured by corroboration of the tip from independent sources.
See id. at 415; Informer's Tip, supra note 10, at 963 n.30. Aguilar itself, however, may sug-
gest that corroboration of the informant's information may be sufficient to permit the tip to
pass the "veracity" prong. See 378 U.S. 108, 114-15 n.5. The Aguilar Court cited Jones v.
United States as an example of a tip passing the "veracity" prong. See id.; 362 U.S. 257
(1960). The affidavit in Jones stated that the informant had given correct information on
previous occasions and that other informants had corroborated the informant's report. See
362 U.S. at 267 n.2. Corroboration, therefore, may be an alternative method of passing the
Aguilar "veracity" prong. See Informer's Tip, supra note 10, at 963, n.30.
Spinelli left the precise role of corroboration of the informant's story unclear. See 393
U.S. at 415. Justice Harlan suggested in Spinelli that corroboration could be a way to pass
the "basis of knowledge" prong as well as the "credibility" spur. See 393 U.S. at 417; Infor-
mants, supra note 9, at 9. Justice Harlan stated that the corroboration of the informant's
story in Spinelli was too insubstantial to support both the inference that the informer was
credible and that the informant had a sufficient basis of knowledge from which to accuse
Spinelli of wrongdoing. See 393 U.S. at 417. Justice Harlan's statement implies that cor-
roboration can bootstrap an otherwise insufficient tip over both Aguilar tests. See Infor-
mants, supra note 9, at 9. Justice White, concurring in Spinelli, rejected the suggestion that
corroboration can help satisfy the "basis of knowledge" prong of Aguilar. See 393 U.S. at
426-29 (White, J., concurring); Informer's Tip, supra note 10, at 963 n.30 (corroboration may
imply that tip is not completely fabricated but does not suggest that informant obtained his
information through personal observation or other dependable manner); Moylan, supra note
9, at 780 (partial corroboration does not pinpoint source of informer's tale). One commen-
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tip shows present truthful performance." As police verify parts of the tip
an inference arises that the remaining parts are also true. 0 Furthermore,
present good performance is analogous to past good performance." Past
good performance is a traditional method of showing that an informant is
credible.2
Corroboration of innocent facts of the informant's tip from any in-
dependent source including preexisting police knowledge or on-the-scene
police observation should be sufficient to supply an index of reliability to
an anonymous telephone tip. 3 Arguably, corroboration of innocent facts
provides no guarantee that the informant is not lying about the in-
criminating fact. 4 The function of corroboration in the analysis,
however, is not to eliminate, but to reduce, the possibility that the inform-
ant is lying. 5 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has suggested that cor-
roboration of innocent facts is sufficient to show that the informant is
credible for probable cause analysis. 8 Corroboration of innocent facts,
therefore, should be sufficient to show informant credibility for
reasonable suspicion analysis.
The courts should not restrict the class of anonymous tips that supply
reasonable suspicion to only those tips involving lethal weapons. Courts
that have limited the use of anonymous tips to lethal weapons situations
tator argues that the Spinelli remedies are not transferable. Id. at 779-81. Corroboration
can cure a defect only in the "veracity" prong of Aguilar and self-verifying detail can cure a
defect only in the "basis of knowledge" prong. Id.
See Stanley v. State, 19 Md. App. 507, 529, 313 A.2d 847 (1974).
See id. at 529, 313 A.2d at 860-61.
See id. at 529, 313 A.2d at 860-61.
See McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 304 (1967) (credibility of informant established
when officer testified that informant had supplied 20 or 25 times before information resulting in ar-
rests and convictions); Informants, supra note 9, at 4-5.
," See Ballou v. Massachusetts, 403 F.2d at 986 (corroboration of tip allowed from facts
known to police); cf. United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. at 583 (plurality opinion) (magistrate may
rely on policeman's knowledge of suspect's reputation in assessing the reliability of informant's tip).
" See Informer's Tip, supra note 10, at 967-68.
" See Comment, Informer's Word as the Basis for Probable Cause in the Federal Courts, 53
CAL. L. REv. 840, 842 [hereinafter cited as Informer's Word]; Informants, supra note 9, at 55.
" See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. at 417. The Spinelli Court cited Draper v. United
States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959), as an example of a tip that police had corroborated sufficiently
through personal observation. See 393 U.S. at 417. Spinelli suggests, therefore, that corroboration
of wholly innocent details may be enough to carry a tip of the Aguilar "credibility" spur. See id.
One commentator has argued that only corroboration of incriminating facts should be relevant in
determining whether corroboration of an informant's report propels the tip past theAguilar credibility
spur. See Informer's Tip, supra note 10, at 967 (skillful liar would always allege some true innocent
facts). The view that only incriminating facts should be relevant in determining whether corrobora-
tion of the tip supplies the necessary credibility of the informant, however, is too restrictive. As
another commentator has noted, the magistrate need not find that the risk that the informer is lying
is eliminated totally, but merely sufficiently reduced by corroboration. See Informants, supra note
9, at 55; Informer's Word, supra note 95, at 842. The better view is that corroboration of in-
criminating facts should be more relevant than corroboration of innocent facts. See Informants,
supra note 9, at 55 (corroboration of incriminating facts should count for much more than cor-
roboration of innocent facts).
19821 1451
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA WREVIEW
have given talismanic significance to the word "gun". The suggestion
that the extent of a citizen's fourth amendment rights depends solely
upon whether the informant uses the word "gun" in his report is unac-
ceptable. The crime alleged, however, should be a factor in the deter-
mination of whether the Terry seizure was reasonable under the fourth
amendment. The government's interest in preventing and detecting
crime becomes stronger as the crime alleged becomes more serious. Con-
versely, a citizen's interest in individual privacy and freedom from
government intrusion becomes stronger as the crime alleged declines in
seriousness. The balancing of individual privacy interests against
governmental interest in preventing and detecting crime is consistent
with the reasoning of Terry.7 In upholding the police action in Terry, the
Court balanced the circumscribed invasion of privacy of the stop and
frisk against the governmental interests of crime prevention and detec-
tion and in the safety of the police officer.9"
The Supreme Court in Adams v. Williams left undecided the ques-
tion whether an anonymous telephone tip could properly form the basis
of a valid Terry stop.99 Since Williams, the Court has denied certiorari on
two cases addressing whether an anonymous telephone tip can provide
the reasonable suspicion necessary for a Terry stop.' Both federal and
state courts have adopted conflicting views on the issue.'0 ' The best ap-
proach is to permit a brief Terry stop if the informant alleges a serious
crime, provides sufficient detail, and police corroborate the tip with
independent information.' This approach is consistent with Supreme
Court's treatment of informant information in other contexts.' 3 The re-
quirement of detail and corroboration protects the individual from the
arbitrary exercise of police power while a brief investigate stop satisfies
the strong governmental interest in detecting and preventing crime.0 4
Furthermore, permitting brief and circumscribed police intrusions based
upon sufficiently trustworthy telephone tips alleging serious criminal ac-
tivity is consistent with the balancing test enunciated in the landmark
Terry decision.'
MICHAEL L. KRANCER
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 22-27; text accompanying notes 3-5 supra.
" See 392 U.S. at 22-27; text accompanying notes 3-5.
See text accompanying note 19 supra.
"o See text accompanying note 26 supra.
"' See text accompanying notes 27-79 supra.
"0 See text accompanying notes 80-98 supra.
103 See text accompanying notes 7-25 & 80-96 supra.
"o See text accompanying notes 97-98 supra.
"' See text accompanying notes 3-5 & 97-98 supra.
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